Tactics and Battles of the Navy
Following the early efforts of many to fight Britain at sea, Congress finally began to organize a naval force in November of 1775. First, the Naval Committee was formed, who set about establishing rules and regulations, largely based off of British statutes. Furthermore, they commissioned several captains who would be the chief officers of this navy. In December, they called for the construction of 13 frigates, who would be the first of the Continental Navy.1 Like the state navies and privateers, the Navy set about disrupting and raiding British shipping, which came to aid the Army greatly. For example, in November of 1776, Washington's grateful army was supplied with 10,000 winter uniforms captured by John Paul Jones from a British ship.2 By the end of 1777, ninety percent of the gunpowder used by American forces was supplied by sea, thanks to the efforts of privateers and the Continental Navy.3
Furthermore, a new plan was developed, under Captain Lambert Wickes and later John Paul Jones, to reduce British morale and to get revenge, which was to attack the British coast and attack British shipping at the source. Beginning in 1777 with Wickes' raid from Nantes along the Irish Sea, the British were enraged at the audacity of the Americans to strike them at home. Unfortunately, Wickes and his ship, Reprisal, were lost in a storm. However, John Paul Jones (commissioned with the Ranger in 1777)4 continued his work with a raid in 1778 on the English town of Whitehaven, where his crew burned the British ships at the docks. This raid culminated with the capture of the Drake, a 20-gun British sloop-of-war, and several other merchant ships.5
However, not all was going swimmingly, as the Continental Navy quickly ran into recruiting problems. Though the colonies had no lack of seasoned sailors, these were quickly gobbled up by the privateering business, leaving the Continentals to recruiting inexperienced "landsmen."6 When comparing the benefits, it is no wonder many chose privateers. For starters, pay could be double what is was on a Continental ship, not to mention those eager fighters dripping with revolutionary fervor would find much quicker action aboard a privateer, whereas Continental ships could take months to get out of port due to regulations.7 Not to mention, anyone could be a privateer, and indeed there was over 1,600 commissioned privateers throughout the war, compared to less than 60 Continental ships.8
The problems did not stop, with recruitment, however, and beginning in 1778, the Navy began to lose ships at a breakneck pace. Starting in March, 5 vessels, including two newly built frigates, were lost, with more to come.9 In July 1779, the Penobscot Expedition resulted in the lose of nineteen vessels, and the 1780 Battle of Charleston saw the loss of several more.10 1780 marked the end of the Navy as a serious fighting force, though the USS Alliance under John Barry fought a few more engagements, the last being in 1783, shortly before peace was made.11
1 Miller, US Navy, pg. 17
2 Miller, US Navy, pg. 18
3 Miller, US Navy, pg. 18
4 Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Volume 9, edited by William James Morgan, (Naval History Division, 1982) pg. 140
5 Miller, US Navy, pg. 23-28
6 Miller, US Navy, pg. 20
7 Hulbert, Untold War at Sea, pg. 32
8 Miller, US Navy, pg. 20, 32
9 Miller, US Navy, 1997, pg. 29
10 Miller, US Navy, 1997, pg. 30
11 Nathan Miller, Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence, (Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company, 2000), pg. 520